Reckoning with Betrayal: Saudi Arabia's Covert Role in the 9/11 Attacks

New evidence suggests that al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks may have had crucial state support from Saudi Arabia, casting doubt on the official version of events and the U.S. government's response.

Jun 10, 2024

The Facts:

For more than two decades, the prevailing narrative has been that al-Qaeda acted alone on 9/11, pioneering a new breed of sophisticated, technologically savvy, and globally coordinated terrorist group that could inflict unprecedented damage on nation-states. However, a recent lawsuit filed by the families of 9/11 victims against the government of Saudi Arabia alleges that al-Qaeda had significant state support for its attacks, with officials from the Saudi government forming and operating a network inside the United States that provided crucial assistance to the first cohort of 9/11 hijackers.

The plaintiffs argue that Saudi officials, notably Fahad al-Thumairy, an imam at a Los Angeles mosque and an accredited diplomat at the Saudi consulate, and Omar al-Bayoumi, who was identified by the FBI as an intelligence operative, organized safe reception, transportation, and housing for hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi upon their arrival in California in January 2000. The support network also introduced the pair to local sympathizers who helped with their day-to-day needs, including immigration matters, communications, and receiving funds from al-Qaeda. Furthermore, the filing alleges that Saudi officials assisted the two al-Qaeda operatives, who were Saudi nationals with limited education and English proficiency, in procuring a car and driver's licenses. This support network, according to the plaintiffs, was crucial to the success of the 9/11 attacks.

The evidence cited in the filing includes FBI investigative reports, memos, communications records, and other contemporaneous materials that are still under seal but are likely to be made public in the coming weeks. Additionally, some of the claims in the filing appear to be corroborated by a document prepared by the FBI in 2021 and by other declassified documents.

The evidence also includes several videotapes seized by the U.K. during raids of Bayoumi's properties, including a video showing a welcome party organized by Bayoumi and Thumairy for the hijackers. Another video contains footage of Bayoumi in Washington, D.C., where he met with Saudi religious officials and filmed the structural features, entrances, and security posts of the U.S. Capitol.

Plaintiffs' claims are contested by lawyers representing Saudi Arabia, who deny that Saudi officials directed support to the hijackers or were otherwise complicit in the attacks. They argue that Thumairy did not assist the hijackers, and Bayoumi's assistance was minimal and unrelated to terrorist activity. The disputes are not entirely about facts, but also about the interpretation of the evidence, such as the videos seized by the U.K. authorities.

Surprisingly, the 9/11 attacks had minimal impact on Saudi Arabia's response to religious extremism, according to diplomats and intelligence officials. However, a pivotal shift occurred when the country faced an attack on its own soil in May 2003: gunmen and suicide bombers targeted three residential compounds in Riyadh, resulting in the loss of 39 lives. This event was a turning point, leading to improved cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in the fight against terrorism.

The religious establishment's power in Saudi Arabia stemmed from the historical alliance between the ruling family and the Wahhabi clergy. Since 1744, when Muhammad ibn Saud and religious reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab joined forces, this partnership has been pivotal to the Saudi state's authority. Religious charities like the MWL, WAMY, and others were established to spread the faith (dawa). The Wahhabi clergy advocated for adherence to their rules but did not favor war as a means to propagate Wahhabism globally.

Change occurred due to the Egyptian government's counterinsurgency against radical Islamists following President Anwar al-Sadat's assassination in 1981. Escaping to Saudi Arabia, those who evaded the Egyptian authorities filled religious universities, teaching roles, and religious bureaucracy positions. This led to an ideological fusion of Wahhabi doctrine and Muslim Brotherhood activism. During the mid-1990s, the ministry became staffed and led by individuals who shared Osama bin Laden's belief in a cosmic struggle between believers and infidels. They considered the United States the epitome of "world infidelity" and believed it was their duty as true Muslims to combat the infidels. Additionally, they embraced a jihadist doctrine that emphasized striking the United States on its own soil as a means to restore Islam's historical prominence.

The Saudi monarchy was largely unaware of the activities of the religious and foreign affairs ministries, ruling but not governing. However, under the rule of King Salman and his son, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the influence of the Wahhabi establishment appears to have been drastically curtailed.

The View:

This emerging picture of Saudi complicity in the 9/11 attacks is deeply troubling and raises serious questions about the validity of the official narrative that has shaped U.S. policy for the past two decades. The materials produced so far in the case suggest a support network for the hijackers that extended beyond Thumairy and Bayoumi, potentially reaching to the Saudi embassy in Washington and senior government officials in Riyadh. If the plaintiffs' claims are substantiated, it would mean that the costly and disastrous "War on Terror" has been rooted in a false premise, with the United States pursuing policies that were based on a flawed understanding of the events of 9/11.

The global "War on Terror" defined American life for 20 years, but ultimately proved to be a costly blunder, as al-Qaeda's threat was contained without the need for prolonged military interventions. If the U.S. had known about the Saudi involvement in 9/11 immediately after the attacks, it may have been able to quickly dismantle the terrorist infrastructure and avoid the costly and protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. If the case goes forward, the presiding judge could order a further, broader discovery phase probing possible Saudi support for the other hijackers beyond Mihdhar and Hazmi.

The revelations from this legal case are likely to prompt another round of reckoning over the failures of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies, which were previously criticized for being "asleep at the switch" before the attacks. The fact that the FBI continued investigating the matter until at least 2021 and had knowledge of the Saudis' support for the hijackers, but their work was shut down by the Justice Department, is particularly egregious and demands thorough scrutiny.

The spectacle of 9/11 and the belief that al-Qaeda was a new breed of super-terrorists led policymakers to overreact, expecting more catastrophic attacks and a reservoir of potential radicals in the Muslim world who could be galvanized by Osama bin Laden's movement. However, the next big attack never materialized, and al-Qaeda's record after 2001 was a "fizzle," puzzling experts. The critical factor that prevented large-scale terrorist attacks by foreign groups in the U.S. was the lack of a support network that could provide cash, documents, facilitate travel, and secure lodging for the would-be terrorists. Without such a network, the 9/11 attacks became an anomaly, and the global "War on Terror" that followed has been, in retrospect, a "farce and tragedy."

The emerging evidence of Saudi complicity in the 9/11 attacks is a damning indictment of the U.S. government's willingness to overlook the actions of its close ally in the name of geopolitical and economic interests. It is time for an honest reckoning with the past and a fundamental rethinking of the policies and assumptions that have guided the country's approach to counterterrorism and national security for the past two decades.

TLDR:

The prevailing narrative has been that al-Qaeda acted alone in the 9/11 attacks, but a recent lawsuit alleges significant state support from Saudi Arabia.
The lawsuit claims that Saudi officials, notably Fahad al-Thumairy and Omar al-Bayoumi, organized support for the hijackers upon their arrival in the U.S., providing safe reception, transportation, housing, and assistance with daily needs.
The evidence includes FBI investigative reports, communications records, and videos seized by the U.K. that appear to corroborate the plaintiffs' claims.
The Saudi government denies the allegations, but the disputes are not entirely about facts, but also about the interpretation of the evidence.
The 9/11 attacks had minimal impact on Saudi Arabia's response to religious extremism until the Riyadh bombings in 2003, which was a turning point leading to improved cooperation with the U.S.
The emerging evidence of Saudi complicity challenges the official narrative and raises questions about the validity of the "War on Terror" and the U.S. government's willingness to overlook its close ally's actions.
The case could prompt a broader reckoning over the failures of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and the need for an honest reassessment of the country's counterterrorism policies.